Statement of Professor John Warren Kindt, Univ. Ill., to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission, "U.S. and International Concerns over the Socio-Economic Costs of Legalized Gambling: Greater than the Illegal Drug Problem?" by Kindt, John Warren
u.s. and International Concerns Over 
the Socio-Economic Costs of 
Legalized Gambling: 
Greater than the Illegal Drug Problem?* 
Statement to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission 
Chicago, Ill. 
May 21, 1998 
Professor John Warren Kindt** 
Commerce and Legal Policy 
University of Illinois 
350 Commerce West 
Champaign, IL 61820 
Phone: (217)-333-6018 
FAX: (217)-244-7969 
*This statement is excerpted from the first draft of an academic article being prepared for 
publication. Several of the reported numbers have not yet been adjusted to 1997 dollars. 
**Professor, Univ. Ill. at Urbana-Champaign. B.A. 1972, William & Mary; J.D. 1976, MBA 1977, 
U. Ga.; LL.M. 1978, SID 1981, U. Va.; Associate, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and 
International Security, University of Illinois. This statement should be interpreted as representing only 
the individual views of the author. 
I. SUMMARY 
A. Gambling Has a Zero-Sum Economic Effect in its Market 
Knowing that legalized gambling has a zero-sum economic effect (except for increased socio-
economic costs) in its market, gambling proponents focus public attention on the wrong market--
that is the local market instead of the strategic/regional market. Only in the most unusual 
hypothetical would the strategic regional benefits gained from legalized gambling outweigh the 
socio-economic costs. Like legalizing cocaine, the socio-economic costs of legalizing gambling 
overwhelm the benefits. Via the meta-language model, the McDougallLasswell methodology of 
policy-oriented jurisprudence confirms this conclusion and the analysis. 1 
B. Case Example: NATO Ally Turkey Legalized Casinos 
in 1983 and Recriminalized Gambling in 1998 
On a nationwide level, NATO member Turkey legalized casinos in 1983 and experienced 
widespread addictions, bankruptcies, crime, and corruption with the result that those casinos were 
recriminalized in 1998.2 
IThis particular Article is summary in scope, but it was conceived within the penumbra of the 
McDougallLasswell model for decision-making. In the areas of legal and government policy, which 
subsume strategic socio-economic and business concerns, the classic decision-making models were 
formulated by the post legal realists, in particular, Professor Myres McDougal and Professor Harold 
Lasswell who postulated a conceptual framework for legal decision-making in a landmark article directed 
toward legal educators and law professors. Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education 
and Public Policy Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943); see also 
Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Criteria for a Theory about Law, 44 S. CALIF. L. REv. 362 
(1971); Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 1 GA. L. REv. 1 (1966); John W. Kindt, 
An Analysis Of Legal Education And Business Education Within The Context Of A J.D.IMBA Program, 
31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 512, 517-18 (1981); John W. Kindt, An Analysis Of Legal Education And Business 
Education Within The Context Of A J.D.IMBA Programme, 13 LAW TEACHER 12, 14-16 (1979). The 
decision-making concepts which McDougal and Lasswell introduced were later expanded to include 
international law and U.S. domestic law, as these areas interfaced with "policy-oriented jurisprudence." 
See John N. Moore, Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 VA. 
L. REv. 662 (1968); The Lasswell-McDougal Entemrise: Toward a World Public Order of Human 
Dignity, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 535 (1974). 
2See,~, Daren Butler (Reuters News Serv.), Casino industry nears final days in Turkey, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 4, 1998, at A8 [hereinafter Turkey Recriminalizes Gambling]. 
C. In 1997 U.S. Gambling Abuse Costs ($80 Billion/Yr.) Exceeded 
Drug Abuse Costs ($70 Billion/Yr.) Because of Gambling 
Addictions. Bankruptcies. Crime. and Corruption 
2 
During a 1997 Congressional hearing, the director of the U.S. Office of National Drug 
Control Policy indicated that during the next decade, America's drug abuse problem will cost 
U.S. society $70 billion per year.3 By comparison, the 1997 socio-economic costs of U.S. 
pathological gambling were at least $80 billion per year with 4.4 million pathological gamblers 
(and another 11 million problem gamblers).4 
D. The ABCs of Legalized Gambling: Addictions. 
Bankruptcies. Crime. and Corruption 
The socio-economic costs of legalized gambling parallel the costs of drug abuse. The ABCs 
of legalized gambling are: 
a. Addictions, 
b. Bankruptcies, and 
c. Crime and corruption. 
Drug abuse brings only the costs of addictions and crime and corruption, but legalized gambling 
adds the cost of bankruptcies. Sociologists indicate that it is not possible for a drug addict to 
3Medical Marijuana Referenda in America: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Crime, House Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 1, 1997) (Statement of General Barry R. McCaffrey, Dir., 
U.S. Off. of Nat' I Drug Control Pol'y). 
4Tbe calculation of .5 percent of the U.S. popUlation or 1.5 million new pathological (addicted) 
gamblers created by legalized gambling between 1994 and 1997 comes from: Div. on Addictions, Harvard 
Medical School, Estimating the Prevalence of Disordered Gambling Behavior in the United States and 
Canada: A Meta-analysis, at 43, Table 13 & 51, Table 16 (Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall, & Joni 
Vander Bilt, Dec. 15, 1997) [hereinafter Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis]; see Press Release of Harvard 
Medical Sch., "Harvard Medical School Researchers Map Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in North 
America," Dec. 4, 1997 (From .84 percent, "the prevalence rate [for pathological gambling] for 1994-1997 
grew to 1.29 percent of the adult population."). 
3 
shoot-up the value of a paycheck in one night, but in one night gambling addicts can lose not 
only their paychecks but also their entire assets, including all of their retirement savings 
(particularly with new 1998 tax changes allowing self-directed retirement accounts). This 
scenario is exacerbated by gambling on the Internet5 which would maximize accessibility and 
place gambling at every work station, in every school, and in every living room. 
E. The Most Relevant Authoritative Studies of the Strategic Socio-Economic 
Costs of Pathological and Problem Gamblers: Where are the Costs Analyses? 
Recommendation: The National Commission Should Request and Be Prepared to 
Subpoena the "High-Rollers" List from Every U.S. Casino 
By 1997, studies financed by the gambling industry were readily admitting that they were 
"BenefitlBenefit" studies and not CostlBenefit studies. For example, the 1998 Missouri study 
financed by Civic Progress did not analyze or even consider the socio-economic costs,6 and the 
1996 Arthur Andersen study of pre-selected industry positives,7 specifically states: "this study 
makes no attempt to analyze the socioeconomic effects of ... gaming."g 
5Gambling on the Internet is illegal under the "Wire Act," 18 U.S.C. §1084, but to tighten controls 
U.S. Senator Jon Kyl sponsored new legislation. See S.474, The Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 
1997: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 28, 1997). 
6Charles Levin, Don Phares, & Claude Louishomme, The Economic Impact Of Gaming In Missouri 
73 (Apr. 1998) (commissioned by Civic Progress). 
7See,~, Statements of Prof. William Eadington, U. Nev.-Reno, Panel Discussion, 10th Int'l Conf. 
on Gambling & Risk Taking, Montreal, Canada, May 31-June 4, 1997. (The communities selected for 
the Arthur Andersen study would be expected to yield positive local impacts, but the casinos in the Kansas 
City economy are probably draining a net $40 million per year from the area, and the Kansas City 
economy is so large that these economic losses go unnoticed.) 
g Arthur Andersen, Economic Impacts of Casino Gaming In the United States: Macro Study (Dec. 
1996) (commissioned by Am. Gaming Assoc.) ("[T]his study makes no attempt to analyze the 
socioeconomic effects of .. : gaming."). 
4 
From the overall U.S./strategic perspective, the most relevant authoritative reports are as 
follows: 
a. Addictions 
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration, Maryland Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene, Task Force on Gambling Addiction in Maryland (Dr. Valerie C. 
Lorenz and Dr. Robert M. Politzer, Co-Chairs 1990) (particularly pages 58-61). 
b. Bankruptcies 
SMR Research Corp., The Personal Bankruptcy Crisis, 1997 (George R. Yacik, Vice 
President 1997) (particularly pages 116-130), summarized in Business Wire, New 
National Study Shows Correlation Between Gambling Growth and the Significant 
Rise in Personal Bankruptcies, Business Wire Features, June 26, 1997. 
c. Crime 
Office of Planning and Budgeting, Florida Office of the Governor, Casinos in 
Florida: An Analysis of the Economic and Social Impacts (ed. Dr. Subhasis Das 
1994) (particularly exec. summary and pages 66-76). 
The authoritative Casinos in Florida is paralleled by the classic overview in: 
Better Government Association of Chicago, Staff White Paper: Casino Gambling 
in Chicago (1992) (Exec. Dir. Terrence Brunner, (312)-641-1181). 
To visualize the strategiclregional impact of gambling, a short report is: 
California Governor's Office of Planning and Research, California and Nevada: Subsidy, 
Monopoly, and Competitive Effects of Legalized Gambling (Dec. 1992). 
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F. Gambling Makes U.S. a Nation of Losers 
Between 1991 and 1996, gambling proponents spent over $105 million9 to obfuscate the 
issues involved in gambling, and therefore delimiting some basic principles of analyzing gambling 
is often useful to the public. To begin any study, the most relevant number is the amount lost 
by gamblers per year in the relevant market (approximately $50 billion lost by the U.S. public 
in 1997).10 Of these amounts lost, approximately 30 percent (primarily from lotteries) results 
in tax revenues to local and state governments (approximately $17 billion in taxes in 1997).11 
In gambling industry studies the underlying focus is usually on: 
1. how fast money can be extracted from the public, and 
2. how efficiently money can be extracted from the public. 
The techniques utilized to accomplish these goals usually are: 
1. new, more, and faster gambling technology, and 
2. new and more sophisticated marketing. 
The speed (and not the ~) of the gambling is the proper focus. In a focused costlbenefit 
analysis, socio-economic costs, tax revenues, and other considerations should be calculated as a 
function of the degree of gambling (i.e., "amounts lost" or "gross revenues"). 
9See, M,., John W. Kindt, Follow the Money: Gambling, Ethics, and Subpoenas, 556 ANNALS OF 
THE AM. ACADEMY OF POLITICAL & SOC. SCI. 85, 87-89, Tables 1 & 2 (1998). 
lOSee INT'L GAMING & WAGERING Bus. (Survey 1997). 
IIId. 
G. The 1997 Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis Omitted the Most Important 
Numbers: Where Are the Reported Numbers of Pathological Gamblers 
and Problem Gamblers for the 120 to 152 Studies Analyzed? 
Recommendation: The Authors of the Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis Should 
Complete Appendix 2 Including the "Reported" Numbers of Pathological Gamblers and 
Problem Gamblers for All 120---).152 Studies 
Recommendation: Copies of the 120---).152 Studies Should be Provided to the Library 
of Congress (as a Special Collection) and to All U.S. Federal Depository Libraries So 
They Can Be Examined by the Public 
II. ADDICTIONS 
A. 1.5 Million People or .5 Percent of the U.S. Population Became 
New Pathological Gamblers in 3 Years from 1994-97 at a Cost of 
$45 Billion Per Year (Div. on Addictions, Harvard Med. School)12 
In 1995, Professor Howard 1. Shaffer of the Harvard Division on Addictions reported: 
"Gambling is an addictive behavior, make no mistake about it .... Gambling has 
all the properties of a psychoactive substance, and again, the reason is that it 
changes the neurochemistry of the brain." l3 
6 
Symptomatic of the individualized problems of gambling addiction is one 1998 Chicago, Illinois 
case where a mother addicted to gambling allegedly killed her two children in separate instances 
to collect $200,000 of their insurance money so she could continue to gamble. 14 
In 1997 it became public that the Colorado lottery was utilizing a "Mindsort" model which 
allegedly was designed to appeal to pathological and problem gamblers indicating that consistent 
12See Table 1 infra and accompanying footnotes; Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis, supra note 4, 
at 43, Table 13 & 51, Table 16. 
13Ford Turner, Neurochemicals Blamed for Compulsive Gambling, 8 COMPULSIVE GAMBLING, Winter 
1995-96, at 1 (citing article in the BEACON-NEWS (Springfield, Mass.», May 10, 1995) (emphasis added). 
14Cam Simpson, Baby death plot told: Suburb mom indicted in insurance scheme, CHI. TRIB., 
Mar. 7, 1998, §1, at 1-2. 
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gamblers were "Lower on trial, but once hooked, hooked."15 A 1997 in-depth survey by the 
Chicago Sun-Times reported that poor people were now viewing the "instant games" of the 
lottery as "a source of income,,,16 and in another 1997 survey it was reported that 51 percent 
of the people gambling were trying "to win money," instead of gambling for entertainment 
(34 percent). 17 
Recognizing that 27 percent to 55 percent of casino revenues are corning from pathological 
gamblers and problem gamblers,18 concerns have been raised about appeals to this market 
segment. 
By purchasing lists from credit-card companies, the casinos know what you 
buy, and then they can track census data to approximate your horne value and 
income. Then there are the direct-mail lists. One such list from the early 
1990s was baldly called the "Compulsive Gamblers Special" and promised to 
deliver, 200,000 names of people with "unquenchable appetites for all forms of 
gambling." Another list features "some 250,000 hard-core gamblers." Yet 
another purveys the names of 80,000 people who responded to a vacation-
sweepstakes-telemarketing pitch. 19 
15Mindsort, 1996 at 15 (emphasis added). See (forthcoming) Joanne Conte, "Case Study of Colorado 
Advertising and Marketing," Paper presented at 1998 Marketing & Public Pol'y Conf., Am. Marketing 
Assoc., Arlington, Va., June 5-6, 1998 (discussing the Colorado lottery's Mindsort marketing and other 
advertising concerns involving gambling). 
16Tim Novak & Jon Schmid, Lottery picks split by race, income, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 22, 1997, 
at 1,24-25. 
17See Miss. St. D. Gambling Group, Soc. Sci. Res. Ctr., National Gambling Survey (1995), 
summarized in Div. on Addictions, Harvard Medical School, THE WAGER, Mar. 17, 1998. 
18See, ~ "Measuring the Costs of Pathological Gambling," Address by Prof. Henry R. Lesieur, Ill. 
St. D., at the Nat'l Conf. on Gambling Behavior, Nat'l Coun. on Problem Gambling, Chicago, Ill., 
Sept. 3-5, 1996 (Table). 
19S. C. Gwynne, How Casinos Hook You: The gambling industry is creating high-tech databases 
to reel in compulsive players, nME, Nov. 17, 1997, at 68, 69 (emphasis added). 
B. 3.5 Million People or 2 Percent of the U.S. Population Became 
New Problem Gamblers in 3 Years from 1994-97 at a Cost of 
$35 Billion per Year (Div. on Addictions, Harvard Med. Schoo1)20 
C. $24 Billion to $88 Billion is the Range of Costs to the Taxpayers 
of the 1.5 Million New Pathological Gamblers and 3.5 Million New 
Problem Gamblers Governments Addicted from 1994 to 199721 
III. BANKRUPTCIES 
A. The Bankruptcy Costs of 1.5 Million New Pathological Gamblers in 
3 Years from 1994-97 are at Least $9 Billion and 315,000 
Bankruptcy Filings (SMR Research)22 
8 
The annual U.s. bankruptcy costs due to legalized gambling are at least $3 billion with 
105,000 new bankruptcy filings.23 These numbers are projected to increase by 50 percent in 
the next couple years as more of the new pathological gamblers finally "bottom out." 
B. The Bankruptcy Costs of 3.5 Million New Problem Gamblers in 
3 Years from 1994-97 Are at Least $3 Billion per Year and 90,000 
Bankruptcy Filings (SMR Research)24 
The annual U.S. bankruptcy costs due to legalized gambling are at least $1 billion with 
30,000 new bankruptcy filings per year. Clinical observations of trends indicated that the 
20See Table 2 infra and accompanying footnotes; Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis, supra note 4, 
at 43, Table 13 & 51, Table 16. 
21See Table 3 infra and accompanying footnotes. 
22See Table 4 infra and accompanying footnotes; SMR RESEARCH CORP., THE PERSONAL 
BANKRUPTCY CRISIS, 1997, 123-24 (1997) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY CRISIS]. Much higher costs can be 
extrapolated from the projections in WEF A Group, The Financial Costs of Personal Bankruptcies, at 1, 
15, 19 (Feb. 1998) [hereinafter Costs of Bankruptcy]. 
23Id. 
24Id.; see Table 5 infra and accompanying footnotes. 
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percentages of bankruptcies due to legalized gambling would tend to increase to 15 percent or 
more as the year 2000 approached.25 
IV. CRIME 
A. The Crime Costs of 1.5 Million New Pathological Gamblers Which 
Governments Created from 1994-97 Would Be $34.2 Billion (Pursuant 
to Fla. Gov. Off. of Planning & Budget Analysis)26 
The most relevant authoritative report for this type of strategic/regional calculation is still 
the 1994 Casinos in Florida: An Analysis of the Economic and Social Impacts.27 Applying 
the methodology of this analysis28 to the 1994-97 reported increases in pathological and 
problem gamblers yields new socio-economic costs to the taxpayers of $34.2 billion for these 
years. 
B. Directly Because of Governments' Legalized Gambling, 1.5 Million People 
or .5 Percent of the U.S. Population Became New Criminals in the 
3 Years from 1994-97 at a U.S. Cost of $12 Billion to $15 Billion29 
Virtually all pathological gamblers commit crimes, but most are not prosecuted because the 
crimes are against family members or close associates. Experts and studies report that between 
12.5 percent and 15 percent of pathological gamblers will become incarcerated. It should also 
25Panel Discussion of Credit Experts, Midwest Conf. of the Nat'l Coalition Against Legalized 
Gambling, Des Moines, Iowa, May 1-2, 1998 (increased filings due to gambling trending toward 
15 percent of total rlings). 
26See Table 6 infra and accompanying footnotes; FLA. GOV. OFF., CASINOS IN FLORIDA: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS 72 (1994) [hereinafter FLA. GOV. REPORT]. 
27FLA. GOV. REpORT, supra note 26. 
28See, ~, id. at 72. 
29See Table 7 infra and accompanying footnotes; Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis, supra note 4, 
at 43, Table 13 & 51, Table 16. 
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be noted that pathological gamblers tend to commit multiple property-acquisition crimes. 
Political scientists note that governments should not encourage or promote criminal behavior or 
crimes which governments do--when they legalize, advertise, and promote gambling. 
Furthermore, sociologists note that U.S. governments are not in the business of selling alcohol 
or tobacco products, but U.S. governments sell gambling packaged as patriotism. 
C. The Partial (Incarceration) Costs of 1.5 Million New Pathological 
Gamblers Which Governments Created from 1994-97 Are at Least 
$2 Billion30 
D. The Average Regulatory and Corrections Costs per Year Calculated 
as a Function of the Total Number of Pathological Gamblers Are 
Between $9,000 and $11,000 per Pathological Gambler per Year31 
v. THE STRATEGIC SOCIO-ECONOMIC COSTS OF PATHOLOGICAL 
GAMBLING AND PROBLEM GAMBLING: 
OVERVIEW OF CALCULATIONS 
A. The 3 Steps to Calculating the Strategic Socio-Economic Costs 
of Pathological Gambling and Problem Gambling 
1. Step One: Calculate the Relevant Population Base Which Usually Corresponds 
to the Population in the "Feeder Markets" OS-mile Radius and 100-mile 
Radius) in the Specialized Studies of the Gambling Industry 
a. StrategiclRegional Populations 
For convenience, the current population of the United States (or other country), any 
state, county, or city can be easily obtained from the latest edition of The World Almanac which 
30See Table 8 infra and accompanying footnotes. See also ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE ADMIN., MD. 
DEP'T HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, TASK FORCE ON GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARYLAND 2, 59-61 
(Valerie C. Lorenz & Robert M. Politzer, Co-Chairs 1990) (a classic report) [hereinafter GAMBLING 
ADDICTIONS IN MARYLAND]. 
31See Table 9 infra and accompanying footnotes. 
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reprints the data of the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Current Bureau of the Census data can also 
be obtained online.32 On a regional/local level, the population base should correspond as 
closely as possible with the "feeder market" populations which are usually given in gambling 
industry studies. In the case of casinos, for example, the feeder market usually corresponds with 
the 35-mile radius and/or the 1 DO-mile radius around the casino. 
With a population of 5.5 million, Missouri serves as a state example. The baseline of 
.77 percent pathological gamblers33 (and 2.33 percent problem gamblers)34 before legalized 
gambling came to Missouri increased by 1994 to .84 percent pathological gamblers35 (and 
approximately 2.93 percent problem gamblers).36 
By 1997 another .5 percent of Missouri's population had become pathological gamblers37 
(and another 2 percent had become problem gamblers).38 At a conservative cost of $30,000 
per new pathological gambler and $10,000 per new problem gambler, from 1994 to 1997 the 
socio-economic costs to the taxpayers of Missouri increased $.83 billion plus $1.1 billion for a 
32For the United States the World Wide Web site is http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/ 
nation/intfile2-l.txt. For Canada the World Wide Web site is http://www.statcan.ca/english/PgdblPeople/ 
Population/demo 1 Oa.htm. 
33U.S. COMM'N ON mE REv. OF mE NAT'L POL'y TOWARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN AMERICA 
73 (U.S. Gov't Printing Off. 1976) [hereinafter U.S. COMM'N ON GAMBLING]. 
34Id. 
35Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis, supra note 4, at 43, Table 13 & 51, Table 16. 
36Id. 
37Id. 
38Id. 
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total of $2 billion.39 Until the market is saturated (~, Las Vegas has a reported 8 percent 
pathological gamblers and 8 percent problem gamblers),4o Missouri will probably increase at 
.15 percent new pathological gamblers per year and .7 percent new problem gamblers for a new 
combined taxpayer cost increase of $633 million per year. 
After Detroit with a population of 1 million initiates downtown casino gambling, the State 
of Michigan can definitely anticipate increases of at least .15 percent new pathological gamblers 
per year and .7 percent new problem gamblers per year due to the increased accessibility and 
acceptability of legalized gambling. Until market saturation occurs, Michigan taxpayers will be 
faced respectively with increased socio-economic costs of at least $45 million per year for the 
increasing numbers of pathological gamblers and $70 million per year for the increasing numbers 
of problem gamblers. 
By recriminalizing various legalized gambling activities, particularly casinos, these trends 
in taxpayer costs can be slowed and even reversed.41 
39The National Impact of Casino Gambling Proliferation: Hearing Before the House Comm. on 
Small Bus., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 77, 80 (1994). For a table, see generally, John W. Kindt, The 
Economic Impacts of Legalized Gambling Activities, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 51, 90-91, Table 3 (1994) 
[hereinafter Economic ImpactsJ. 
40Address of Prof. Frederick W. Preston, U. Nev.-Las Vegas, atthe Nat' I Conf. on Gambling Behav., 
Nat'l Coun. Problem Gambling, Chicago, Ill., Sept. 3-5, 1996 (8% pathological gamblers plus 8% problem 
gamblers). See also, Frederick W. Preston, Ricardo Gazel, and Bo Bernhard, "Gambling in Las Vegas: 
Survey of a Gaming Supportive Community," at Sec. 4.1-4.2 (5.3% pathological gamblers & 2.6% 
problem gamblers). It is significant that pathological gamblers in Las Vegas outnumber problem gamblers 
by a ratio of 2 to 1. In most studies, the problem gamblers greatly outnumber the pathological numbers. 
41See Table 10 infra and accompanying footnotes; Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis, supra note 4, 
at 43, Table 13 & 51, Table 16. 
b. Specific Populations: Examples Include the Military, 
Businesses, and Adolescents 
13 
Once the relevant population base is established, the same percentages are applicable. 
For example, the increased percentages of the general U.S. population base42 would generally 
apply to businesses, such as banks, insurance companies, financial institutions, credit agencies, 
manufacturing companies and service companies. Between 1994 and 1997, an average company, 
for example, with 1000 employees would have experienced a .5 percent increase in pathological 
gamblers in its workforce and a 2 percent increase in problem gamblers resulting in increased 
personnel costs of at least $150,000 plus $200,000 for a total of $350,000. 
(1) Adolescent Gambling is Double the Adult Rates 
Often specific studies have refined these percentages. As a general rule, the 
percentages of pathological and problem adolescent gamblers are double those of the adult 
population.43 However, adolescents do not have the asset base of adults and therefore, the 
socio-economic costs are lower. Even so, this generation is the first U.S. generation in 100 years 
raised to believe that legalized gambling is an acceptable activity and has career opportunities. 
(2) Military "Readiness" and Addicted Gamblers: Between 1991 and 
1997, the Military Personnel Rates for Pathological Gambling 
(Increased 66 Percent) and for Problem Gambling (Increased 
108 Percent) for a Combined "Doubling" of Military Problems 
and $3.6 Billion per Year in New Costs44 
In 1991 the U.S. military established a baseline of 2 percent pathological 
gamblers and 5.1 percent problem gamblers. Using the general popUlation increases from 1994 
42Id. See Tables 1-2 infra and accompanying footnotes. 
43See Table 10 infra and accompanying footnotes. See,~, Economic Impacts, supra note 39, at 
66, nn.117-18; Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis, supra note 4, at 51, Table 16. 
44See Table 11 infra and accompanying footnotes. 
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to 1997 reported in the Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis, by 1997 the anticipated increases 
among military personnel were 50,250 new pathological gamblers (a 66 percent increase) and 
162,000 new problem gamblers (a 108 percent increase), for new respective costs of $2 billion 
and $1.6 billion or $3.6 billion per year.45 The national security issues of military "readiness" 
and the government-sponsored "doubling" of the military's pathological/problem gambling 
dilemma should be investigated by the U.S. Congress. By definition, pathological gamblers are 
not only addicted but also compromised by their addiction, and they become security risks. 
A sample comment in 1995 from U.S. Air Force Commander, General John M. 
Loh provided the military's general perspective on these problems: "I am generally opposed to 
riverboat [casino] gambling near our bases because of the problems it creates for our people and 
the communities in which they live,,46 (U.S. Air Force Commander, General John M. Loh, 
HQ Air Combat Command, Feb. 10, 1995).47 Business groups near military bases provide a 
similar perspective: "We have talked to almost all of the base commanders in Tidewater 
[Virginia] and found none who favor Riverboat Gambling.... Riverboat gaming will drive our 
military [bases] away .... ,,48 
In one AFB example involving illegal off-base slot machines, service personnel 
lost 13%-19% of the entire base's monthly payroll and two lieutenants who were pathological 
46Letter from U.S. Air Force Commander, Gen'l John M. Loh to U.S. Rep. Herbert H. Bateman, 
Feb. 10, 1995 (citing specific negative impacts of recently opened riverboat casino on Barksdale, 
AFB, La.). 
47Id. 
48Know Casinos, Bus. Group, Memorandum to Virginia Cities, Sept. 1, 1995 (opposing proposal for 
Va. casinos) (William Kincaid, Co-Chair). 
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gamblers committed suicide49 (Preparedness Subcomm., U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed 
Services). 50 By 1997, the 1257 illegal slot machines involved in this earlier case had been 
replaced with 11,624 off-base legal video slot machines.51 
2. Step Two: Calculate the Relevant Percentages of the Population Which Are 
Pathological Gamblers and Problem Gamblers 
As indicated earlier, unless a specific study gives authoritative percentages for a specific 
population base, the general popUlation percentages can be applied. Since inexplicably, the 
Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis did not report the most important numbers; that is, the 
percentages of pathological and problem gamblers reported in the 120 to 152 studies 
reviewed,52 the general population percentages must be utilized. These percentages are: 
197653 199454 199755 
Pathological .77% .84% (.5% Increase) ~ 1.29% 
Gamblers 
Problem 2.33% 2.93% (2% Increase) ~ 4.88% 
Gamblers 
These percentages are the starting points for general calculations. 
49Hearing on "Illegal Gambling Activities Near Keesler Air Force Base," Preparedness Subcomm., 
U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Biloxi, Miss. (1951). 
51Ben C. Toledano, Gambling 'Carpetbaggers' Make Mississippi a Lesson to Other States, WORLD 
HERALD (Omaha, Neb.), Apr. 13, 1997, at B13 (abbreviated reprint from Apr. 7 article in NAT'L REv.). 
52The percentages of pathological gamblers and problem gamblers were not reported for any of the 
reviewed 120 to 152 studies. Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis, supra note 4, at 107, Appendix 2. 
Compare, Economic Impacts, supra note 39, at 89, Table 2 (reporting these percentages), with id. 
53U.S. COMM'N ON GAMBLING, supra note 33, at 73. 
54Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis, supra note 4, at 43, Table 13 & 51, Table 16. 
3. Step 3: Multiply the Numbers (and Increases) by the Socio-Economic Costs of 
One Pathological Gambler and/or One Problem Gambler 
a. Overall Strategic Costs 
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According to experts, each pathological gambler creates socio-economic costs of 
between $10,000 (partial listing of costs)56 and $80,00057 per year. A conservative range of 
$30,000 to $50,000 per year is quite reasonable. 
b. Specialized Costs: For Example, the Insurance Industry,58 
the Banking Industry, or the Financial Industry 
Obviously, the value of services performed by one employee in a particular industry 
might be higher than in another industry. Exemplifying another area of concern in Iowa one 
pathological gambler in financial services embezzled $4.5 million59 and similarly, one banker 
embezzled $10.2 million.60 Apparently, 42 percent of pathological gamblers admit stealing 
from their employers.61 In a related example, it took only one employee to engage in the 
unauthorized use and loss of $1 billion to bankrupt Baring's Bank,62 and in a similar situation 
56See Table 3 infra and accompanying footnotes. 
57GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARYLAND, supra note 30, 59-61. 
58See Table 12 infra and accompanying footnotes. 
59Debra Illingworth Greene, Gambling: Wins & Losses, TIIE LUTIIERAN, Dec. 1997, at 46, 47. 
60Henry R. Lesieur, Pathological Gambling, Work, and Employee Assistance, 1 J. EMPLOYEE 
ASSISTANCE REs. 32, 32 (1992). 
61See Table 13 infra and accompanying footnotes. 
62Laura Proctor, The Barings Collapse: A Regulatory Failure Or A Failure Of Supervision?, 22 
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 735, 738 (1997) ("a gamble" in the market), see id. at 752 n.155 (Daiwa lost 
$1.1 billion). See also Brad Stone, How He Busted the Bank, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 13, 1995, at 39 ("[H]e 
started to gamble."). 
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Daiwa Bank of Japan lost $1.1 billion63 because of one employee. By definition, the very best 
blue-collar and white-collar employees, the Type-A personalities, are the most likely to become 
pathological gamblers. Pathological gamblers are also 4 to 5 times more likely to attempt suicide 
than the general public, and there are significant costs to society.64 
Outside of its own employee costs, the insurance industry probably loses $6.6 billion in 
insurance fraud per year and $13.2 billion in surrendered policies per year due to pathological 
and problem gambling.65 Government-sponsored gambling contributes to significant increases 
in fraud and in these losses. 
B. Illegal Gambling: Increasing Legalized Gambling Is Linked to 
Increases in Illegal Gambling 
There are no authoritative studies indicating that legalizing gambling activities taps the illegal 
gambling market. Conversely, there is growing evidence from experts that for every one dollar 
in new legalized gambling there is one dollar (or more) in new illegal gambling.66 
63Daiwa Bank of Japan lost $1.1 billion. Proctor, supra note 62, at 752 n.155. 
64See Table 14 infra and accompanying footnotes. Compare Table 12 infra and accompanying 
footnotes, with id. 
65Henry R. Lesieur & Kenneth Puig, Insurance Problems and Pathological Gambling, 3 J. GAMBLING 
BEHAV. 123, 123 (1987) (adjusted to 1997 $). 
66Statement and Testimony of William G. Hall, Exec. Dir., Ill. Econ. & Fiscal Comm., before the 
Ill. Legislative Gambling Task Force, Springfield, Ill., July 20, 1996; see Statement of William G. Hall, 
Exec. Dir. & Edward Boss, Chief Econ., Ill. Econ. & Fiscal Comm'n, "Gambling In Illinois: Its History, 
Revenue and Future Trends," presented to the Ill. Legislative Task Force on Gambling, Springfield, Ill., 
July 20, 1996. Gambling critics indicated that the series of socio-economic negatives reported in the 
seriatim 1996 hearings of the Illinois Legislative Task Force on Gambling were so embarrassing to 
gambling proponents that those public hearings were never printed for dissemination to the public and the 
press. See also Address by William Jaboda, former member of organized crime, to the Midwest 
Conference of the Nat'l Coalition Against Legalized Gambling, Des Moines, Iowa, May 1-2, 1998 
[hereinafter Jaboda 1998 Speech in Des Moines]; see National Gambling Impact and Policy Comm'n Act: 
Hearing on H.R. 497 before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 60-89 (1995) 
(Statement and Testimony of William Jaboda, former member of organized crime) [hereinafter 
Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995]. 
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According to former organized crime member William Jahoda, the crime costs associated 
with legalizing gambling are so overwhelming that those politicians supporting legalized gambling 
are either "ignorant" or "on the take.,,67 Increased "legalization,,68 and "access,,69 to 
gambling grows the legal market, but also grows the illegal gambling market as a "shadow 
market" because illegal gambling competes better by providing: (1) better odds, (2) better credit, 
(3) better service, and (4) a heightened sensation factor.70 According to 1995 testimony before 
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, legalized gambling is like "heaven 
on earth" for organized crime?1 
VI. U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE SPREAD OF LEGALIZED 
GAMBLING TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
A. Legalized U.S. Gambling Destabilizes the U.S. 
and World Economies 
1. Legalized U.S. Gambling Destabilizes the U.S. Economy 
Public confidence is essential to the U.S. and international financial systems. As 
summarized by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as he tried to re-establish public confidence: 
"The only thing we have to fear, is fear itself."n For governments to become gambling 
67Jahoda 1998 Speech in Des Moines, supra note 66; see Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995, 
supra note 66, at 60-89. 
68The "acceptability factor" means that the more types and forms of gambling become acceptable by 
being "legalized," the more increases there will be in the numbers of pathological and problem gamblers. 
69The "accessibility factor" means that the more accessible various forms of gambling are to the 
public, the more increases there will be in the numbers of pathological and problem gamblers. 
70See generally, Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995, supra note 66, at 60-89. 
71Id. See also Jahoda 1998 Speech in Des Moines, supra note 66. 
72President Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address, Mar. 4, 1993, in JOHN BARTLETI, 
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 971 (14th ed. 1968). 
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predators on their own citizens undermines public confidence and destabilizes financial and 
economic systems. Among other problematic impacts, legalized gambling undermines and can 
destroy public confidence in: 
1. the banking system (gambling interface with banking activities federally 
prohibited),73 
2. the investment system, 
3. the credit system, 
4. the retirement system, 
5. government decisionmaking, and 
6. military personnel readiness. 
To reiterate a classic example, it took just one employee making unauthorized use of Barings 
Bank's money to bankrupt the bank.74 In another classic scenario, gambling on the Internet 
or via other public communications mechanisms can integrate all financial systems. As indicated 
earlier, Internet gambling would place gambling at every work station, at every school desk, and 
in every living room. In one night at home, a person could gamble away their liquid assets, their 
home, and their retirement savings to overseas accounts. 
Via even a cursory review of meta-language analysis,75 McDougallLasswell policy-oriented 
jurisprudence76 indicates that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in California v. Cabazon Band 
73See, ~, 12 U.S.C. §§ 25a, 339, 1730c, 1829a. Financial institutions may not participate, for 
example in lotteries or "announce, advertise, or publicize the existence of any lottery." See I. NELSON 
ROSE, GAMBLING AND THE LAW 46 (1986). In 1995, just one Barings Bank employee without adequate 
oversight bankrupted the bank by losing $1 billion. 
74Id. 
75See footnote 1 supra and accompanying text. 
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of Mission Indians 77 should be reversed. By ignoring practical, interdisciplinary and economic 
impacts, the U.S. Supreme Court in Cabazon not only opened the door to gambling economies 
in the 50 states, but de facto forced the practical acceptance and eventual development of 
gambling economies by the states, the U.S., and other countries.78 A strong argument can be 
made that the 78 casinos in Turkey created such socio-economic and political turmoil that in 
August 1997, the government in Ankara passed a law effective February 19, 1998 which basically 
recriminalized all gambling in Turkey. 79 
2. Legalized u.s. Gambling Destabilizes the World Economy 
A sine qua non of international economic stability is the maintenance of a favorable world 
public order.8o Conversely, the ability of governments to maintain a favorable world public 
order is enhanced by international economic stability.81 To highlight these basic principles, 
international economists and political decisionmakers have often referenced the classic economic 
and political instability occasioned by the negotiated settlement of World War I, the subsequent 
causal linkages to the Great Depression, and the resultant impacts contributing to the precipitation 
of World War II. At extraordinary human cost, myriad political-economic lessons were learned 
from these historical scenarios.82 These lessons reordered Western concepts of maintaining 
international political-economic stability and initiated the historically unique Marshall Plan 
77480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
78See, M.,., Economic Impacts, supra note 39, at 70 n.147. 
79See, M.,., Turkey Recriminalizes Gambling, supra note 2, at A8. 
80See generally footnote 1 supra and accompanying text. 
8lId. 
82Id. 
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paralleled by the United Nations system and related World Bank safeguards.83 These initiatives 
were essential elements to the regimen of creating and maintaining a favorable world public order 
for the post-World War II era. 
Focused on more obvious and traditional economic trends and perhaps anesthetized by 
general economic prosperity during the 1990s, international policymakers and economists have 
missed the economic and political significance of the international megatrend toward legalizing 
organized gambling activities. Touted by U.s. gambling companies as the economic "wave of 
the future," by the 1990s gambling activities were being organized and legalized on an 
unprecedented scale. As this analysis demonstrates, the spread of legalized gambling activities 
in the international community constitutes a destabilizing influence on most economic systems 
in the developed countries and can even collapse the economies of the less-developed countries 
(LDCs). Policymakers promising, for example, that casino-developments will bring economic 
prosperity to the people of Namibia constitute disingenuous and callous promises which raise 
images of casino colonialism. 
3. U.S. Casino Colonialism in the Developing Countries 
Recognizing the potential "domino effect" of economic-financial instability in any country, 
during 1996 and 1997, the United States and the World Bank community spent billions of dollars 
in loans to support countries with economic-financial instabilities. One example, included Mexico 
which shortly after receiving billions of dollars in financial aid announced that part of its 
economic salvation would involve bringing U.S. casinos to Mexico City. Casinos vis-a-vis 
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development aid constitute a contradiction in U.S. policy with strategic financial implications for 
international financial stability. 
Lost in the 1997 Pacific-Rim financial crisis was the 1990s trend in those countries 
toward more legalized gambling activities, particularly U.S. exported gambling technologies. The 
spread of legalized gambling in the Pacific-Rim, which was catalyzed by U.S. gambling 
technology and a laissez faire attitude toward the economic implications, created philosophical 
financial instability--particularly in some cultures and demographic scenarios. Third World 
countries and even some industrialized countries lack the political stability, infrastructure, and 
cultural norms essential to limit and regulate legalized gambling. The gravamen is that the 
United States sets the standard for the world community and the United States has strategic 
financial and national security issues involved in not encouraging legalized gambling activities. 
4. The United States Sets the Gambling Standards for the World: 
Permitting and Promoting Legalized Gambling Destabilizes the 
the International Financial Community and Jeopardizes the 
World Economy 
The U.S. State Department and the World Bank, in particular, need to review the potential 
consequences of exporting U.S. gambling technologies and philosophies to other countries. The 
United States sets the gambling standards for the world, and the spread of U.S. legalized 
gambling during the 1980s and 1990s first precipitated and then catalyzed the acceptance of 
legalized gambling activities by other countries. Interestingly, as the U.S. public backlash against 
gambling gained momentum during the 1990s, U.S. gambling interests intensified their efforts 
to expand in other countries. 
Lacking the political/economic stability of the United States, less-developed countries such 
as Mexico, Taiwan, and Namibia began in the mid-1990s to view new casinos as valid strategies 
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for economic development. Legalized gambling in the United States has already evidenced many 
economic failures, and these failures: 
underscore the economic cannibalism that looms ahead as casinos proliferate. 
Casinos thrive as long as they lure out-of-towners. But once the wagering 
visitors get their own casinos back home, the locals tend to be left holding the 
bag. This boom-and-bust pattern is pandemic, reports William R. Eadington, 
an economist, who heads the University of Nevada's Institute for the Study of 
Gambling and Commercial Gaming in Reno. In place after place, he says, a 
casino-based economy first soars but then slumps into a "black hole.,,84 
Any objective independent costlbenefit study should arrive at similar conclusions. When 
costlbenefit studies do not reach these conclusions, important questions often arise involving: 
a. First Amendment academic freedoms, 
b. government integrity, and 
c. ethical business practices. 
Both domestically and abroad, U.S. policy should not be directly promoting or indirectly 
encouraging gambling activities (particularly casinos). 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A. The U.S. Policy Decision: To Become a Non-Gambling 
Economy or a Gambling Economy 
U.S. economic stability is the sine qua non of international financial and economic stability. 
Conversely, gambling economies in other countries can precipitate a worldwide economic 
destabilization via a "domino effect." The United States needs to set the international standard 
by promoting and reinventing its economy as a non-gambling economy. 
84Hellman, Casino Craze, TRAVEL HOLIDAY, Mar. 1994, at 86 (citing to Prof. William Eadington, 
U. Nev.-Reno) (emphasis added). 
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B. Legalizing Gambling? The Overall Issue for Decisionmakers 
"Statesmen think about the next generation, but politicians only think about the next 
election" constitutes a truism which highlights the issue for decisionmakers considering legalizing 
gambling. Objective independent costlbenefit analyses will almost invariably conclude that 
decisionmakers should not legalize gambling activities. Like NATO ally Turkey, the U.S. 
Congress should recriminalize all legalized gambling activities, except in Nevada and Atlantic 
City where at this economic juncture, recriminalization would appear to collapse those particular 
economies. Since gambling companies have already reaped multiple 100 percent returns on their 
investments, U.S. gambling could be recriminalized everywhere else in the United States and 
regional economies would rebound with this cost-effective pump-priming of new "consumer 
dollars" diverted from "gambling dollars.,,85 
H-JK.79-Z2 
85See John W. Kindt, U.S. National Security And The Strategic Economic Base: The Business/ 
Economic Impacts Of The Legalization Of Gambling Activities, 39 ST. LOUIS U.LJ. 567 (1995); National 
Gambling Impact & Policy Comm'n Act: Hearing on H.R. 497 before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
104th Cong., 1st Sess. 519-45 (1995) (statement and article of Prof. John W. Kindt, Univ. Ill.). 
Conclusions: U.S. National Security Issues 
1. U.S. gambling abuse costs ($80 billion/yr.) are greater 
than U.S. drug abuse costs ($70 billion/yr.) due to: 
a. Addictions ($10,OOO/yr. to $60,OOO/yr. per 
pathological gambler); 
b. ]!ankruptcies ($4 billion/yr. to $6.6 billion/yr.); 
c. ~rime and ~orruption ($15 billion/yr. to 
$34 billion/yr.). 
2. Legalized U.S. gambling destabilizes: 
a. U. S. military "readiness" and military personnel, 
b. The financial and banking systems, 
c. The U. S. economy, and 
d. The world economy. 
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Table 1* 
1.5 Million People or 
.5% of U.S. Population Became 
New Pathological Gamblers 
in 3 Years from 1994-97 
(Division on Addictions, Harvard Medical School) 
u.s. Population Increase in Addicted Gamblers2 New Addicted 
(1994 ~ 1997)1 .84% (1994) ~.1.29% (1997) Gamblers 
(1994 ~ 1997) 
262 million ~ 268 million 2.2 million3 --)- 4.4 million4 1.5 millions 
(Harvard Addictions) 
*Footnotes at end of this Article. 
New Costs to U.S. 
TaxpayerslY r. 
$45 billionNr.6 
Comparison: U.S. 
Drug Abuse Costs = 
$70 billionNr.7 
Table 2* 
3.5 Million People or 
2% of U.S. Population Became 
, New Problem Gamblers 
in 3 Years from 1994-97 
. (Division on Addictions, Harvard Medical School) 
U.S. Population Increase in Problem Gamblers2 New Problem 
(1994 ... 1997)1 2.93% (1994) ... 4.88% (1997) Gamblers 
(1994 ... 1997) 
262 million ~ 268 million 7.6 million3 ~ 11 million4 3.5 millions 
(Harvard Addictions) 
*Footnotes at end of this Article. 
New Costs to U.S. 
TaxpayerslYr. 
$35 billionIYr.6 
Comparison: U.S. 
Drug Abuse Costs = 
$70 billionIYr.7 
U.S. Population 
(1994-97)1 
262 million ~ 
268 million 
Table 3* 
1.5 Million People or 
.5%, of U.S. Population Became 
New Patholol:ical Gamblers 
in 3 Years from 1994-97 
(Division on Addictions, Harvard Medical School) 
Increase in Pathological New Pathological 
Gamblers2 (1994-97) Gamblers (Est.) 
.84% -1.29% (1994-97) 
2.2 million ~ 4.4 million 1.3 million ~ 2.2 million 
7f (Shaffer}3 
;If 1.5 million 
(Kindt)4 
2.6 million ~ 3.5 million 
(Thompson)S 
(Total Path. & Prob. ?) 
American Medical Association6 
(Total 1994 Adjusted to 1997 $) 
(Socio-Medical Costs) 
Goodman 19987 
(Total Path. & Prob. ?) 
Eadington 19968 
Lorenz9 
(1988 Adjusted to 1997 $) 
Total New 
Costs (Est.) 
(1994-97) 
Wouldn't Estimate? 
$45 billion 
$24 billion ~ 
$41 billion 
$40 billion ~ 
$61 billion 
$40 billion ~ 
$50 billion 
Wouldn't Estimate? 
$40 billion ~ 
$88 billion 
~I!I~~ Range of New Socio-Economic Costs: $24 billion ~ $88 billion ~ 
.. Probable Range (Partial Costs): $40 billion ~ $50 billion .4 
*Footnotes at end of this Article. 
Table 4* 
Bankruptcy Costs 
Costs of 1.5 Million New Pathological Gamblers1 1994-97 
Socio-Economic Costs Average Average Cost Population Total 
Category Cost (Adjusted2 Creating New 
to 1997 $) New Costs 
Problem 
21 % Filed Bankruptcies3 $113,6405 315,000 $36 billion 
> 20% (SMR Research)4 (1995) (105,000/yr.) ($12 billion/yr.) 
23% (Wis., Thompson)6 
28% (Quebec)6 
Costs per Bankruptcy7 (SMR) $29,650 $29,650 315,000 $9.3 billion 
(WEF A: $33,308)8 (1997) (105,000/yr.) ($3.1 billion/yr.) 
Legal Costs8 $505 ~ $1000 $505 ~ $1000 $.45 billion 
(1997) ($.15 billion/yr.) 
Court Costs8 $418 ~ $837 $418 ~ $837 
(1997) 
Admin. Costs9 $100 ? 
(Thompson: "Too Low") (1995) 
> 10% (projected to 15%) of 315,000 $9 billion 
Total Bankruptcy Costs lO of (l05,000/yr.) ($3 billion/yr.) 
$40 billion per (,earl I and 1.35 
million filings I per year 
Pathological Gamblers = 75% of Total GamblinglBankruptcy Problem 12 
Problem Gamblers = 25% of Total GamblinglBankruptcy Problem 12 
Annual Range: $3 billion/yr. ~ $12 billion/yr. 
Total New Bankruptcy Costs Due to Pathological Gamblers, 1994-97: $12 billion ~ $36 billion 
Note: Usually ignored by bankruptcy attorneys, it was historically required that anyone filing for bankruptcy 
was required to indicate money and assets lost because of gambling during the year, including "dates, 
names, and places, and the amounts of money ... lost." 11 U.s.c. Appendix, Bankruptcy Rules, 
Form 7, in 1. NELSON ROSE, GAMBLING AND THE LAW 46 (1986). 
*Footnotes at end of this Article. 
~ 
~ 
Table 5* 
Bankruptcy Costs 
Costs of 3.5 Million New Problem Gamblers1 1994-97 
Socio-Economic Costs Category Average Average Cost Population Total 
Cost (Adjusted2 Creating New 
to 1997 $) New Costs 
Problem 
31 % Filed Bankruptcies3 $40,066 350,000 $14 billion 
(10% Kindt Conservative No.)4 (1995) (117,000/yr.) ($4.7 billion/yr.) 
Costs Per BankruptcyS $29,650 $29,650 350,000 $10.4 billion 
(SMR) 
(WEF A: $33,308)6 
(1997) (117,000/yr.) ($3.5 billion/yr.) 
Legal Costs6 $505 ~ $1000 $505 -+ $1000 $.15 billion 
(1997) ($.05 billion) 
Court Costs6 $418 ~ $837 $418 -+ $837 
(1997) 
Administrative Costs 7 $100 ? 
(Thompson: "Too Low") (1995) 
>10% (projected to 15%) of Total 90,000 $3 billion 
Bankruptcy Costs of $40 billion (30,000/yr.) ($1 billion/yr.) 
per year9 and 1.35 million 
filings9 per year 
Pathological Gamblers = 75% of Total Gambling/Bankruptcy Problem 10 
Problem Gamblers = 25% of Total Gambling/Bankruptcy Problem 10 
Annual Range: $1 billion ~ $4.7 billion 
Total New Bankruptcy Costs Due to Problem Gamblers, 1994-97: $3 billion ~ $14 billion 
Note: Usually ignored by bankruptcy attorneys, it was historically required that anyone filing for bankruptcy 
was required to indicate money and assets lost because of gambling during the year, including "dates, 
names, and places, and the amounts of money ... lost." 11 U.S.C. Appendix, Bankruptcy Rules, 
Form 7, in I. NELSON ROSE, GAMBLING AND THE LAW 46 (1986). 
*Footnotes at end of this Article. 
~ 
~ 
Table 6* 
Crime Costs 
Costs of 1.5 Million New Pathological Gamblers,1 1994-97 
(Fla. Gov's Off. Rep't & Div. on Addictions, Harv. Med. Sch.) 
Socio-Economic Costs Category Average Average Cost Population 
Cost (Adjusted2 Creating 
(Reported) to 1997 $) New Problem 
Probation3 $1,624 
Community Control3 $858 
Incarceration3 $19,987 
(75% Average) 
Postsecondary Release Supervision3 $363 
Total $22,832 1.5 million 
*Footnotes at end of this Article. 
Total 
New 
Costs 
$34.2 billion 
Table 7* 
Crime Costs 
Directly Because of Legalized Gambling, 
1.5 Million People or .5% of U.S. Population 
Became New Criminals in 3 Years from 1994-97 
(Division on Addictions, Harvard Medical School) 1 
Socio-Economic Costs Category Ave. Cost 
Average Cost 
(Adjusted2 to 
(Reported) 1997 S) 
Crime3 & Regulatory Costs4 $8,000 ~ $10,000 $8,000 ~ $10,000 
(adjusted to entire population of 
pathological gamblers/yri 
Average amounts stolen are not included, 
since economics argue these amounts are 
mere transfers of wealth (but these 
amounts are still transfers from the 
business community to the criminal 
community). 
*Footnotes at end of this Article. 
Cumulative New 
Costs to U.S. 
TaxpayerslY r. 
$12 billion ~ 
$15 billion 
$4 billionIY r. ~ 
$5 billionIY r. 
Comparison: Total 
u.s. Tax Revenues 
from Gambling = 
$17.1 biIlion6 
Table 8* 
Crime Costs 
Partial (Incarceration) Costs of 1.5 Million New Pathological Gamblers,! 1994-97 
Socio-Economic Costs Category Average Average Cost Population Total 
Cost (Adjusted2 Creating New 
(Reported) to 1997 $) New Problem Costs 
80% Admit Committing Civil Offenses3 
70% Steal for Money4 
100% (Lorenz, 1992)5 
61.5% Admit Illegal Acts3 
44% Stole from Employer6 
37% Stole Mone~ 
33% Wrote Bad Checks3 
28% Delinquent in Taxes3 
25% Involved in Auto Accidents3 
47.3% Admit Speeding to Gamble3 
25% Indicted4 
25% (Lorenz, 1992)5 
18% Gambling Related Arrests6 
20% Admit Forger; 
12.5% Serve Time4 $20,2257 $20,2557 9375010 , $1.9 billion 1 0 
13% ~ 15% (Lorenz)8 (31,250IYr.) ($.6 billionlyr.) 
20%-30% Pre-existing Prisoners = 
Pathological Gamblers9 
(Looney, 1998) 
*Footnotes at end of this Article. 
Table 9* 
Average Regulatory and Corrections 
Costs per Year Calculated as a Function 
of the Total Number of Pathological Gamblers 
Ave. 
Cost 
Recurring Costs Per Year Reported 
PolicelRegulatory Oversight Costs 
State Police2 $763 ~ $1,801 
Local PoliceIFire3 $207 
Regulatory4 $1,018 ~ $1,545 
ProsecutoriallIncarceration Costs 
District Attomet $291 ~ $418 
Costs to Courts $191 ~ $272 
White Collar Crime Costs 7 $4,123IYr. 
One-Year Fixed Costs 
Intermediate Incarceration8 $2,100IYr. 
New Prisons (Fixed Cost)9 +$1,092 
$3,1921 
Path. Gamb. 
Long-Term Incarceration Costs $2,225IYr. 
$18,000 ~ $25,000 (Looney, 1997)10 
$25,000 (Lorenz, 1992)11 
$20,224.65 (Corrections Yearhook)12 
$8,818 ~ $10,591 
*Footnotes at end of this Article. 
Ave. Cost 
(Adjustedl 
to 1997 $) 
Table 10* 
Number of U.S. Pathological 
Gamblers and Problem Gamblers 
(Division on Addictions, Harvard Medical School) 1 
Population Base 1997 Pathological Gamblers 1997 U.S. Totals 
U.S. 1997 Adults (> 20 yrs.) Adolescents (10-19 yrs.) 
268 million 2.2 million 2.2 million 4.4 million 
1997 Problem Gamblers 
Adults (> 20 yrs.) Adolescents (10-19 yrs.) 
5.3 million 5.7 million 11 million 
1997 Combined P&P 
Adults (> 20 yrs.) Adolescents (10-19 yrs.) 
7.5 million 7.9 million 15.4 million 
Total: Range of Estimates: 11.2 million ~ 23 million 
Central Estimate: 17.1 million ~ 
*Footnotes at end of this Article. 
Number of 
U.S Military 
Personnel2 
2% 
(1991)1 
1.5 million 30,000 
Table 11 
Since 1991 Legalized Gambling has Destabilized the 
"Readiness" of U.S. Military Personnel by a 
660/0 Increase in Addicted Gamblingl 
.5% -+ 1.35% Increase 2% -+ 5.6% 
in Pathological Gamblers Increase in 
1994-97 Problem Gamblers 
Straight .5% Proportional Total 5.1% Straight 2% Proportional 
Increase3 Increase4 1997 (1991)1 Increase6 Increase' 
1994-97 1994-97 1994-97 1994-97 
7,500 20,250 50,250 78,0005 30,000 84,000 
Total 
1997 
162,000 
;!,. Military cost = $2 billion 
/f 
~ Military Cost = $1.6 billion 
?I 
All Pathological and Problem Gamblers Destabilize 
Military "Readiness." Total: 212,250~ 
Nota Bene: Since 1991, these problems have doubled. 
Table 12* 
Addictions Costs 
Costs of 1.5 Million New Pathological Gamblers l 1994-97 
Insurance Industry 
Socio-Economic Costs Category Average Average Cost Population 
Cost (Adjusted2 Creating 
(Reported) to 1997 $) New Problem 
47% Insurance Fraud (33% of Total Ins. $65,468 $705,000 
Fraud)3 
--
(1987) 235,000Nr. 
47% of Male Pathological Gamblers 
32% False Claim/Auto Accident 
21% Stolellns. Co. paid 
16% False Claim (not fire/theft) 
15% Faked burglary/property theft 
15% Staged claim (not fire/theft) 
11% Engaged in/profited from arson 
8% Caused loss to insurance co. 
8% Created/staged accident 
52% Surrendered Policies3 $13,200 
(1987) 
Health Costs 
Costs of Suicides 
*Footnotes at end of this Article. 
Total 
New 
Costs 
$6.6 billion3,4 ~ 
(Est. 1997) 
IJ. 
$13.2 billion3 
(Est. 1997) 
Table 13* 
Addictions Costs 
Costs of 1.5 Million New Pathological Gamblers! 1994-97 
Socio-Economic Costs Category Average Average Cost Population Total 
Cost (Adjusted2 Creating New 
to 1997 $) New Problem Costs 
44% Steal from Employer3 
34% Fired from or Quit Work3 
Ave. Wage $33,410 (Looney)4 
Ave. Wage $35,000 (Minn. Rpt.)5 
26% Divorced or Separated3 
59% Considered Separating6 
26% Divorced or Separated6 
17% Divorced7 
10% Separated7 
*Footnotes at end of this Article. 
Table 14* 
Addictions Costs 
Costs of 1.5 Million New Pathological Gamblers,! 1994-97 
Suicides 
Socio-Economic Average Average Population Total 
Cost Category Cost Cost Creating New 
(Reported) (Adjusted New Costs 
to 1997 $)2 Problem 
79% Wanted to Die3 
66% Contemplated Suicide4 
67% (Looney)3 
47.5% (Frank)5 
49% Had Definite Plan to Kill Themselves4 
16% Had Attempted Suicide4 
25% (Thompson) 
18% (Looney)3 
13% (Frank, Lester, & Wexler)5 
1.1 % In General Population5 
.1% Completed Suicides 
In Debt to Business $75,26210 
$29,0009 
$28,3154 
$27,8506 
Ave. Wage: Lost Productivity $23,0009 
$30,0007 
$33,4104 
$35,0008 
"Increase in legalized gambling ... may be leading to a significant increase in suicide rates among both 
residents of and visitors to communities where casinos are thriving .... " Study links suicide increase to 
gambling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1997.11 
http://webserv I.startribune.com/cgi-binlStOnLine/article?thisSlug=suic 16>. 
OF ALL DEATHS 11 
Suicides by Out-of-State Visitors 
Nongambling Community 
.97% 
*Footnotes at end of this Article. 
Gambling Communities 
4.28% (Las Vegas) 
2.31 % (Reno) 
1.87% (Atlantic City) 
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1998 the average salary was approximately $30,000 per year and since by definition 
pathological gamblers lose their productivity, the cost of $30,000 per year is quite 
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Activities, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 51, 90-91, Table 3 (1994). 
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1997. Using an estimated population base of 200 million, Prof. Thompson calculates 
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8. WEFA Group, The Financial Costs of Personal Bankruptcy, at 1, 15, 19 (Feb. 1998) 
[hereinafter Costs of Bankruptcy]. 
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Robyn Taylor Farets, Cash advances, Int'l Gaming & Wagering Bus., Sept. 1996, at 
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CRISIS, infra, at 116-30; Business Wire, New national study shows correlation between 
gambling growth and the significant rise in personal bankruptcies, BUSINESS WIRE 
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bankruptcies]. Another survey by the University of Minnesota Medical School in 
April 1996 found results which roughly paralleled the 1995 Minnesota study, but the 
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differentiating between pathological and problem gamblers. Id. at 119. 
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parallel what could be reasonably expected among a population base of pathological 
and problem gamblers. However, some arguments for a different percentage mix 
could be made on the basis of different studies. See, id. Even so, at least 10 percent 
of all bankruptcy filings and costs can be attributed to legalized gambling and an 
increase to 15 percent in the years 1998 to 2000 could be quite reasonably anticipated. 
Footnotes for Table 6 
1. The calculation of .5 percent of the U.S. population or 1.5 million new pathological 
(addicted) gamblers created by legalized gambling between 1994 and 1997 comes 
from: Div. on Addictions, Harvard Medical School, Estimating the Prevalence of 
Disordered Gambling Behavior in the United States and Canada: A Meta-analysis, 
at 43, Table 13 & 51, Table 16 (Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall, & Joni 
Vander Bitt, Dec. 15, 1997) [hereinafter Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis]; see Press 
Release of Harvard Medical Sch., "Harvard Medical School Researchers Map 
Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in North America," Dec. 4, 1997 (From .84 percent, 
"the prevalence rate [for pathological gambling] for 1994-1997 grew to 1.29 percent of 
the adult population."). 
2. Bur. Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't Labor (1997). 
3. FLA. Gov. OFF., CASINOS IN FLORIDA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
IMPACTS 72 (1994). 
Footnotes for Table 7 
1. The calculation of .5 percent of the U.S. population or 1.5 million new pathological 
(addicted) gamblers created by legalized gambling between 1994 and 1997 comes 
from: Div. on Addictions, Harvard Medical School, Estimating the Prevalence of 
Disordered Gambling Behavior in the United States and Canada: A Meta-analysis, 
at 43, Table 13 & 51, Table 16 (Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall, & Joni 
Vander Bilt, Dec. 15, 1997) [hereinafter Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis]; see Press 
Release of Harvard Medical Sch., "Harvard Medical School Researchers Map 
Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in North America," Dec. 4, 1997 (From .84 percent, 
"the prevalence rate [for pathological gambling] for 1994-1997 grew to 1.29 percent of 
the adult population."). 
2. Bur. Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't Labor (1997). 
3. According to the authoritative Compulsive Gambling Center in Baltimore, Maryland, 
virtually all pathological gamblers commit crimes (one Australian study concludes 
70 percent), but only 12.5 percent to 15 percent are incarcerated. Most pathological 
gamblers commit multiple property-acquisition crimes. Therefore, over 1.5 million 
new crimes were committed from 1994 to 1997. 
4. See detailed chart on "Average Regulatory and Corrections Costs," infra. For the most 
authoritative report in this issue area, see FLA. OFF. Gov., CASINOS IN FLORIDA: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS 67-76 (1994). 
5. Obviously, every pathological gambler does not initially commit a property-acquisition 
crime in every year, but by definition, pathological gamblers will eventually engage in 
such crimes, although these crimes are often overlooked by family members and close 
associates. See,~, the citations in John W. Kindt, Increased Crime and Legalizing 
Gamblin!2 Activities: The Impacts on the Socio-Economics of Business and 
Government, 30 CRIM. L. BULL. 538, 550-52 (1994). 
6. INT'L GAMING & WAGERING Bus. (Survey 1997). 
Footnotes for Table 8 
1. The calculation of .5 percent of the U.S. population or 1.5 million new pathological 
(addicted) gamblers created by legalized gambling between 1994 and 1997 comes 
from: Div. on Addictions, Harvard Medical School, Estimating the Prevalence of 
Disordered Gambling Behavior in the United States and Canada: A Meta-analysis, 
at 43, Table 13 & 51, Table 16 (Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall, & Joni 
Vander Bilt, Dec. 15, 1997) [hereinafter Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis]; see Press 
Release of Harvard Medical Sch., "Harvard Medical School Researchers Map 
Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in North America," Dec. 4, 1997 (From .84 percent, 
"the prevalence rate [for pathological gambling] for 1994-1997 grew to 1.29 percent of 
the adult population."). 
2. U.S. Bur. Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't Labor (1997). 
3. ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE ADMIN., MD. DEP'T HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, TASK 
FORCE ON GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARYLAND 61 (Valerie C. Lorenz & Robert M. 
Politzer, Co-chairs 1990) [hereinafter MARYLAND REpORT]. 
4. Australian Study reported at 10th Int'l Conf. on Gambling & Risk Taking, Montreal, 
Canada, May 31-June 4, 1997. For more detailed analyses, see, ~, Henry Lesieur, 
compulsive Gambling: Documenting the Social and Economics Costs, Table 2, at 21 
(1991), published in part as Henry Lesieur, Compulsive Gamblin£, SOCIETY, May-June 
1992, at 42. See also Henry Lesieur & Kenneth Puig, Insurance Problems and 
Pathological Gambling, 3 J. GAMBLING BEHAV. 123 (1987). 
5. According to the Compulsive Gambling Center, virtually all pathological gamblers 
commit crimes, but generally, 75 percent of pathological gamblers are not caught or 
the criminal charges are dropped. This latter situation is usually because pathological 
gamblers initially commit their crimes against family members or close associates. 
Interview with Dr. Valerie Lorenz, Exec. Dir., Compulsive Gambling Ctr., Inc., 
Baltimore, Md., Dec. 10, 1992 [hereinafter cited as Lorenz Interview]; MARYLAND 
REpORT, supra note 3, at 28. For general discussions of the interface between 
compulsive gambling and resultant criminal behavior, see Brown, Pathological 
Gamblin£ and Associated Patterns of Crime: Comparisons With Alcohol and Other 
Drug Addictions, 3 J. GAMBLING BEHAV. 98 (1987); Henry R. Lesieur, Gambling, 
Pathological Gambling. and Crime, in THE HANDBOOK OF PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING 
(T. Galski ed. 1987). See generally J. Livingston, COMPULSIVE GAyIBLERS: 
OBSERVATIONS ON ACTION AND ABSTINENCE (1974); Henry R. Lesieur, Female 
Pathological Gamblers and Crime, in GAMBLING BEHAVIOR AND PROBLEM GAMBLING 
495 (1993) [hereinafter Gamblers and Crime]. See generally, John W. Kindt, 
Increased Crime and Legalizing Gambling Operations; The Impact on the Socio-
Economics of Business and Government, 30 CRIM. 1. BULL. 538, 550-52 nn.61-69 
(1994). 
Footnotes for Table 8 (continued) 
6. "Measuring the Costs of Pathological Gambling," Address by Prof. Henry Lesieur, Ill. 
St. U., at the Nat'l Conf. on Gambling Behavior, Nat'l Coun. on Problem Gambling, 
Chicago, Ill., Sept. 3-5, 1996 [hereinafter cited as "Measuring the Costs"]. 
7. CRIM. JUSTICE INST., THE CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK 1997223 (eds. Camile Graham 
Camp & George M. Camp 1997). 
8. Lorenz Interview, supra note 5; John W. Kindt, The Economic Impacts of Legalized 
Gambling Activities, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 51, 94 n.285 (1994) (referencing Dr. Valerie 
Lorenz, CompUlsive Gambling Ctr.); see MARYLAND REpORT, supra note 5, at 28. 
"Research on the connection between pathological gambling and crime is still in its 
infancy." Gamblers and Crime, supra note 5, at 495. 
9. N.J. Coun. on Compulsive Gambling, Legislative Guide For Responsible Gaming In 
Your State 2 (Jan. 25, 1997). 
10. Of 1.5 million new pathological gamblers, this analysis reduces to 6.25 percent the 
lowest expert rate of those gamblers who serve time which is 12.5 percent. This 
extremely conservative estimate would indicate that 93,750 new pathological gamblers 
served time between 1994 and 1997 (or an additional 31,250 prisoners per year). 
Footnotes for Table 9 
1. Bur. Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't Labor (1997). 
2. To provide "before" and after" estimates of the impact of pervasive legalized gambling 
activities, this range of costs was extrapolated from Illinois analyses \vhich were 
subjected to in-depth academic and public scrutiny. See, e.g., Speech by Terrance W. 
Gainor, Dir. Ill. St. Police, at the Ann. IAODAPCA Luncheon, May 8, 1992, at 10 
(for "police services alone") [hereinafter cited as Dir. Ill. St. Police]; Chicago Crime 
Comm'n, Analysis of Key Issues Involved in the Proposed Chicago Casino Gambling 
Project 21 (1992). The range of projected increases to the budget of the Illinois state 
police was between $42 million and $100 million, but since the Director frequently 
utilized the more cautious estimate of $100 million, this is the estimate utilized. 
Although delimited in budgetary terms, these estimates apparently parallel the 
$41 million to $100 million increased costs calculated by interfacing "the incidence of 
index crime and the subsequent cost to the criminal system to handle those crimes." 
Ill. Crim. Just. Info. Authority, Casino Gambling and Crime in Chicago 46 (1992) 
[hereinafter cited as Crim. Just. Info.]. These cost estimates did not include increased 
costs for (1) regulation; (2) victimization impact; (3) prosecution of organized crime; 
(4) additional facilities for system workload; or (5) "response to non-index crimes, 
such as DUI, fraud, extortion, embezzlement, prostitution, and drug offenses." Crim. 
Just. Info., infra, at 46 & 47. See also Ill. Crim. Just. Info. Authority, Riverboat 
Gambling and Crime in Illinois 2, 3 (1994) (referencing the $41 million to 
$100 million in costs as specifically related to "Chicago"). The lack of uniform 
categories of costs in many reports makes comparisons difficult. 
Government policymakers frequently argue that the burden of proof should be 
on the legalized gambling interests to refute any cautious projections by state 
agencies--particularly law enforcement agencies. On the other hand, proponents of 
increased legalized gambling activities often argue that law enforcement bureaucracies 
tend to inflate the costs to the criminal justice system to increase their budgets. See 
generallv, John W. Kindt, Increased Crime and Le2:alizing Gambling Operations: The 
Impact on the Socio-Economics of Business and Government, 30 CRIM. L. BULL. 538, 
539, nn.2-3, 546 n.42 (1994) [hereinafter Increased Crime and Le2:alizing Gamblingl 
See generally Ill. St. Police, Div. Crim. Investigation, Intelligence Bur., How Casino 
Gambling Affects Law Enforcement (Apr. 16, 1992) [hereinafter cited as Ill. St. Police 
Report]. The laundering of money by legalized gambling operations appears to be a 
common problem. During 1992, for example, "Atlantic City's casinos ... [were] 
under investigation for laundering drug money." Roeser, Chicago Casino Plan 
Gambles Citv Future, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1992, at A10 [hereinafter cited as 
Roeser]. Less than two years after being initiated, the Illinois State Police Director, 
Terrance Gainor, reported that investigations were "being conducted into suspected 
laundering of illegal drug profits through the riverboats" in Illinois. Urbanek, Probe 
Creating Fears for Riverboats' Ima£e, DAILY HERALD (Arlington Heights, Ill.), 
Footnotes for Table 9 (continued) 
Nov. 21, 1992, § 1, at 4; Laundering on Riverboats, NEWS-SUN (Waukegan, 111.), 
Nov. 20, 1992, at 1. 
For analyses by the Chicago Crime Commission opposing the introduction of 
land-based casino gambling to Chicago, see Report of the Chicaf,!O Crime Commission 
on Organized Crime in Chicago (J. Conlon, Pres. 1990). For analyses by the N.Y. 
Attorney General's office opposing the introduction of land-based casino gambling to 
New York State, see R. Abrams, Report of Attorney General Robert Abrams in 
Opposition to Legalized Casino Gambling in New York State (~'1ay 1981). For 
analyses of the impacts of land-based casino gambling on Atlantic City, New Jersey, 
see O'Brien & Flaherty, Regulation of the Atlantic City Casino Industry and Attempts 
to Controls Its Infiltration by Organized Crime, 16 RUTGERS LJ. 721 (1985). 
For examples of the parallel costs of pathological gambling activities and other 
medical treatment costs (such as for alcoholics), see Politzer, Morrow, & Leavey, 
Report on the Societal Cost of Pathological Gambling and the Cost-Benefit! 
Effectiveness of Treatment (5th Nat'l Conf. on Gambling and Risk Taking 1981) 
[hereinafter cited as Politzer, Morrow, & Leavey]. "Studies demonstrate that there is a 
high degree of overlap among pathological gambling, alcoholism and drug addiction." 
Lesieur, Female Pathological Gamblers and Crime, in GAMBLI1\G BEHAVIOR AND 
PROBLEM GAMBLING 495, 497 (1993) [hereinafter cited as Gamblers and Crime]. 
3. To provide a "before" and "after" estimate, these local police and fire costs were 
extrapolated from the conservative estimates prepared by proponents themselves of a 
$2-billion casino complex for Chicago. 
See Chicago Gaming Commission, Economic and Other Imoacts of a Proposed 
GaminQ. Entertainment and Hotel Facility 236-41 (May 19, 1992) (report prepared by 
Deloitte & Touche, Chicago, Ill.) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Gaming Facility 
Report]. Editorial, Economically. casinos are a good bet, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 24, 
1992, § 4, at 2 [hereinafter cited as Economicallv]. "Deloitte & Touche also projects 
the loss of 2,300 jobs and $126 million in sales Downstate, $65 million in casino 
regulatory costs and $11.4 million in annual costs for police and fire protection." Id. 
at 2. For the actual estimates, see Proposed Gaming Facilitv Report, infra, at 234-45. 
For a comparison of the administrative costs of state lotteries, see DeBoer, The 
Administrative Costs of State Lotteries, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 479 (1985). 
4. The low-range regulatory costs were averaged and extrapolated from the costs per year 
for New Jersey casino regulator efforts. The high-range estimate was a 1989 estimate 
by Professor William Thompson given in the context of regulating future casinos. For 
a continuum of New Jersey regulatory costs, see seriatim editions of St. N.J., 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report. Compare, id. with the 1992 estimates of 
Increased Crime and LeQalizing Gambling, supra note 2, at 545-46. See,~, St. N.J., 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 238 (1992) ($56-$57 million for casino 
Footnotes for Table 9 (continued) 
regulatory costs); N.J. Casino Control Comm'n, 1992 Annual Report 23 (1992) 
($57 million for casino regulatory costs in 1992, $62 million in 1991). Slight 
decreases in regulatory costs may occur over time. See,~, N.J. GOVERNOR'S ADV. 
COMM'N ON GAMBLING, REpORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 65 (1988) ($66.4 million 
regulatory costs and 1,362 regulatory employees in 1986 for "all" gambling activities, 
and $76.6 million regulatory costs in 1987); see N.J. St. Budget, FY 1986-1987; N.J. 
St. Budget, FY 1991-1992. See also, Roeser, note 2 supra, at 10 ($59 million for 
casino regulatory costs in 1992). In 1989, the regulatory costs for Atlantic City were 
also estimated at $85 million per year. Statement of William Thompso:p., Prof. Mg't & 
Pub. Admin., UNL V, before the Ill. Sen. Comm. regarding S.B. 572 on Riverboat 
Gambling, Sept. 27, 1989. See generally Lee & Chelius, Government Regulation of 
Labor-Management Corruption: The Casino Industrv Experience in New Jersey, 42 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 436 (1989); Ill. St. Police Report, note 2 supra. 
5. TIMOTHY P. RYAN, PATRICIA CONNOR, & JANET F. SPEYRER, THE IMPACT OF CASINO 
GAMBLING IN NEW ORLEANS 46-47 (1990) [hereinafter GAMBLING IMPACT IN NEW 
ORLEANS]' These calculations were apparently analyzed and considered to be 
"balanced" and valid. ROBERT GOODMAN, LEGALIZED GAMBLING As A STRATEGY 
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 85-87 (Ctr. for Econ. Dev., U. Mass.-Amherst 1994); 
Ill. St. Police Report, note 2 supra, at 9; Dir. Ill. St. Police, note 2 supra, at 9-10. 
These costs do not include many "indirect costs" to the criminal justice system. For 
analyses of other "criminal law" issues, see generally Gaines, Criminal Law: Florida's 
Legal Lotteries, 9 U. FLA. L. REv. 93 (1956). 
6. GAMBLING IMPACT ON NEW ORLEANS, supra note 5, at 46-47. For a parallel analysis 
of these costs, see Increased Crime and Legalizing Gambling, supra note 2, at 547-48. 
7. Politzer, Morrow, & Leavey, supra note 2, at 18-20. For parallel analyses of these 
costs, see John W. Kindt, The Economic Impacts of Legalized Gambling Activities, 43 
DRAKE L. REv. 51, 89-93 at Table 3, n.282 (1994) [hereinafter Economic Impacts]; 
Increased Crime and Legalizing Gambling, supra note 2, at 550. 
8. Politzer, Morrow, & Leavey, supra note 2, at 9, 18-20. For parallel analyses of these 
costs, see Economic Impacts, supra note 7, at 89-93 at Table 3, n.283; Increased Crime 
and Legalizing Gambling, supra note 2, at 550. For uniformity, the number of 
$21,000 per year is reduced to $2,100 per pathological gambler to reflect a 10 percent 
incarceration rate. 
9. to provide "before" and "after" estimates of the impact of pervasive legalized gambling 
activities, this cost was extrapolated from Illinois analyses which were subjected to 
in-depth academic and public scrutiny. See,~, Interview with Ill. Gov. James 
Edgar, on Crossfire, Cable News Network, Jan. 6, 1993. For a parallel analysis of this 
cost, see Increased Crime and Legalizing Gambling Activities, supra note 2, at 546-47. 
Footnotes for Table 9 (continued) 
10. N.J. Comm. on Compulsive Gambling, Legislative Guide For Responsible Gaming In 
Your State, at 2 (Jan. 25, 1997). 
11. Economic Impacts, supra note 7, at 94 n.285 (referencing Dr. Valerie Lorenz' 1992 
estimates of $25,000 per year for young prisoners and $50,000 per year for older 
prisoners with medical costs). CRIM. JUSTICE INST., THE CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK, 
1997 75 (eds. Camille Graham Camp & George M. Camp) (365 days multiplied by the 
healthcare "average daily cost per confined inmate in 1996" of $54.25 equals $19,801) 
[hereinafter CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK, 1997]. 
12. CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK, 1997, supra note 11, at 223 (365 days multiplied by the 
"overall average cost per prisoner per day" of $55.41 equals $20,224). 
Footnotes for Table 10 
1. It is significant that for the first time in decades the 1997 study by Professor Howard 
Shaffer attempted to redefine the American Psychiatric Association's term 
"pathological gambling" (or addicted gambling) as "level 3 gambling" and"problem 
gambling" as "level 2 gambling." Critics of the Shaffer meta-analysis noted that the 
analysis was entirely funded by a $140,000 grant from the gambling industry to 
reanalyze the 120 to 152 existing studies documenting the prevalence of pathological 
gamblers and problem gamblers. The "meta-analysis" resulted in: (1) new 
PR-conscious terms such as "level 3 rates of gambling," (2) an attempt to redefine the 
.77% baseline for pathological gambling established by the 1976 National Commission 
on Gambling in America at .84% (which critics opined could operate to the PR benefit 
of the gambling industry), and (3) omission of the most important numbers of the 120 
to 152 existing prevalence studies--specifically the rates of pathological gamblers and 
problem gamblers. See,~, Div. on Addictions, Harvard Medical School, Estimating 
the Prevalence of Disordered Gambling Behavior in the United States and Canada: A 
Meta-analysis, at 51 (Table 16) and 107 (App. 2) (Howard 1. Shaffer, Matthew N. 
Hall, & Joni Vander Bilt, Dec. 15, 1997) [hereinafter Harvard Addictions 
Meta-analysis]; see Press Release of Harvard Medical Sch., "Harvard Medical School 
Researchers Map Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in North America," Dec. 4, 1997 
(From .84 percent, "the prevalence rate [for pathological gambling] for 1994-1997 
grew to 1.29 percent of the adult population."). Compare U.S. Cml~I'N ON THE REv. 
OF A NAT'L POL'y TOWARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN NvIERICA 73 (U.S. Gov't 
Printing Off. 1976), with Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis, infra at 43, Table 13. 
Footnotes for Table 11 
1. NAT'L TECH. INFORMATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T COM., 1992 WORLDWIDE SURVEY OF 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND HEALTH BEHAVIORS MlONG MILITARY PERSONNEL 12-14 to 
12-30 [hereinafter MILITARY PERSONNEL]. 
2. U.S. Dep't Defense (1997). In 1991, U.S. military personnel totaled 2 million but this 
force strength was subject to drawdown. See,~, MILITARY PERSONNEL, supra 
note 1, at 12-14 to 12-20. By 1996-97, U.S. military personnel numbered 1.5 million. 
U.S. Dep't Defense (1997). To simplify comparisons between years, a 1991 base 
population of 1.5 million is utilized. 
3. Div. on Addictions, Harvard Medical Sch., Estimating the Prevalence of Disordered 
Gambling Behavior in the United States and Canada: A Meta-analysis, at 43, Table 13 
(Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall, & Joni Vander Bilt, Dec. 15, 1997) [hereinafter 
Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis]; see Press Release of Harvard Medical Sch., 
"Harvard Medical School Researchers Map Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in North 
America," Dec. 4, 1997 (From .84 percent, "the prevalence rate [for pathological 
gamblers] for 1994-1997 grew to 1.29 percent of the adult population."). Since the 
Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis did not include the calculations for essential 
elements, some reasonable estimates and conclusions consistent with the data need to 
be drawn. 
4. A proportional increase is calculated as 2 percent military personnel 19911.77 percent 
general public 1991 equals 3.35 percent military personnel 1997/1.29 percent general 
public 1977--for an increase of 1.35 percent from 1991 to 1997. See, id. 
5. The 78,000 military personnel are not precisely 5.1 percent since the 78,000 was the 
calculation in the report. MILITARY PERSONNEL, supra note 1, at 12-14 to 12-20. 
6. Using the classic standard baseline of 2.33 percent established by the 1976 U.S. 
Commission on Gambling would yield a 2.55 percent increase in problem gamblers 
from 1994 to 1997. U.S. COMM'N ON THE REv. OF A NAT'L POL'y TOWARD 
GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN AMERICA 73 (U.S. Gov't Printing Off. 1976) [hereinafter 
U.S. COMM'N ON GAMBLING]' 
7. A proportional increase is calculated as: 5.1 percent military personnel 199112.33 
percent general public 1991 equals 10.68 percent military personnel 1997/4.88 percent 
general public 1997--for an increase of 5.6 percent from 1991 to 1997. See, note 3, 
supra. 
8. In 1997, the socio-economic costs of a civilian pathological gambler ranged between a 
partial estimate of $10,000 and an in-depth estimate of $60,000 per year. This 
analysis utilizes $40,000 per year to reflect the life/death responsibilities inherent in 
military service. One accident can and has caused the loss of multi-million dollar 
equipment and lives. 
Footnotes for Table 11 (continued) 
9. A socio-economic cost figure of $10,000 per problem gambler per year which is 
utilized in this context is probably too conservative considering that the average 
civilian problem gambler is earning well over the average 1997 annual salary of 
approximately $30,000 per year which is further increased since most problem 
gamblers are super-achievers, Type-A personalities. For a costs table see, John W. 
Kindt, The Economic Impacts of Legalized Gambling Activities, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 
51, 90-91, Table 3 (1994). 
Footnotes for Table 12 
1. The calculation of .5 percent of the U.S. population or 1.5 million new pathological 
(addicted) gamblers created by legalized gambling between 1994 and 1997 comes 
from: Div. on Addictions, Harvard Medical School, Estimating the Prevalence of 
Disordered Gambling Behavior in the United States and Canada: A Meta-analysis, 
at 43, Table 13 & 51, Table 16 (Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall, & Joni 
Vander Bilt, Dec. 15, 1997) [hereinafter Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis]; see Press 
Release of Harvard Medical Sch., "Harvard Medical School Researchers Map 
Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in North America," Dec. 4, 1997 (From .84 percent, 
"the prevalence rate [for pathological gambling] for 1994-1997 grev, to 1.29 percent of 
the adult population."). 
2. Bur. Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't Labor (1997). 
3. Henry R. Lesieur & Kenneth Puig, Insurance problems and patholo!Zical gambling, 
3 J. GAMBLING BEHAVIOR 123, 125-27 (1987) [hereinafter Insurance and gambling]. 
4. The National Insurance Crime Bureau estimates that annually the total U.S. cost of 
"property/casualty-based insurance fraud" is $20 billion. Nat'l Insurance Crime Bur., 
"Insurance Fraud: The $20 Billion Disaster," Chi., Ill. (1996) [hereinafter Insurance 
Fraud $20 Billion]. Adjusting Professor Lesieur's most conservative 1987 numbers of 
$3.3 billion in fraud and $6.6 billion in surrendered policies to 1997 dollars equals 
approximately $6.6 billion in fraud and $13.2 billion in surrendered policies (without 
adjusting for population increases). Insurance and gambling, supra note 3, at 133-34. 
Interestingly, these numbers conform to current numbers that place total insurance 
fraud at $20 billion when in 1987 Professor Lesieur indicated that 33 percent of 
insurance fraud is committed by pathological gamblers which equals $6.6 billion (the 
same as the adjusted 1987 estimate). Compare id. at 134 ("[P]athological gamblers 
could account for almost a third of the industry loss" from fraud.), with Insurance 
Fraud $20 Billion, infra, at 1. 
Footnotes for Table 13 
1. The calculation of .5 percent of the U.S. population or 1.5 million new pathological 
(addicted) gamblers created by legalized gambling between 1994 and 1997 comes 
from: Div. on Addictions, Harvard Medical School, Estimating the Prevalence of 
Disordered Gambling Behavior in the United States and Canada: A Meta-analysis, 
at 43, Table 13 & 51, Table 16 (Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall, & Joni 
Vander Bilt, Dec. 15, 1997) [hereinafter Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis]; see Press 
Release of Harvard Medical Sch., "Harvard Medical School Researchers Map 
Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in North America," Dec. 4, 1997 (From .84 percent, 
"the prevalence rate [for pathological gambling] for 1994-1997 grew to 1.29 percent of 
the adult population. "). 
2. Bur. Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't Labor (1997). 
3. Lesieur citing G.A. It only takes one employee to destroy an entire company. In 
1995, Barings Bank lost $1 billion and went bankrupt because of the unauthorized use 
of funds by just one employee--the very type of employee (Type-A personality) most 
likely to become a pathological gambler. In a similar situation one employee's 
unauthorized use of funds cost Daiwa Bank of Japan $1.1 billion. Laura Proctor, The 
Barings Collapse: A Regulatorv Failure Or A Failure Of Supervision?, 22 BROOK. J. 
INT'L L. 735, 735, 738 (1997); see also id. at 752 n.l55. In another example in Iowa 
one pathological gambler embezzled $4.5 million. Debra Illingsworth Greene, 
Gambling: Wins & Losses, THE LUTHERAN, Dec. 1997, at 46, 47 ($4.5 million 
embezzled). In Illinois one employee embezzled $580,000--more than was ever spent 
on all treatment of pathological gamblers in Illinois. Speech of Henry R. Lesieur, 
Dir., Inst. for Problem Gambling, 10th Int'l Conf. on Gambling and Risk Taking, 
Montreal, Canada, July 1997. 
4. N.J. Coun. on Compulsive Gambling, Legislative Guide For Responsible Gaming In 
Your State (Jan. 25,1997) (appended news release of Mar. 20,1996). 
5. See SMR RESEARCH CORP., THE PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY CRISIS, 1997 119 (1997) 
(confirming a 1995 Minnesota Study). 
6. ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE ADMIN., MD. DEP'T HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, TASK 
FORCE ON GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARYLAND 61 (Valerie C. Lorenz & Robert M. 
Politzer, Co-chairs 1990). 
7. "Measuring the Costs of Pathological Gambling," Address by Prof. Henry R. Lesieur, 
Ill. St. D., at the Nat'! Conf. on Gambling Behav., Nat'l Coun. on Problem Gambling, 
Chicago, 111., Sept. 3-5, 1996 [hereinafter cited as "Measuring the Costs"]. 
Footnotes for Table 14 
1. The calculation of .5 percent of the U.S. popUlation or 1.5 million ~ pathological 
(addicted) gamblers created by legalized gambling between 1994 and 1997 comes 
from: Div. on Addictions, Harvard Medical School, Estimating the Prevalence of 
Disordered Gambling Behavior in the United States and Canada: A Meta-analysis, 
at 43, Table 13 & 51, Table 16 (Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall, & Joni 
Vander Bilt, Dec. 15, 1997) [hereinafter Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis]; see Press 
Release of Harvard Medical Sch., "Harvard Medical School Researchers Map 
Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in North America," Dec. 4, 1997 (From .84 percent, 
"the prevalence rate [for pathological gambling] for 1994-1997 grew to 1.29 percent of 
the adult population."). 
2. U.S. Bur. Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't Labor (1997). 
3. N.J. Coun. on Compulsive Gambling, Legislative Guide For Responsible Gaming In 
Your State (Jan. 25, 1997). 
4. "Measuring the Costs of Pathological Gambling," Address by Prof. Henry R. Lesieur, 
Ill. St. U., at the Nat'! Conf. on Gambling Behav., Nat'l Coun. on Problem Gambling, 
Chicago, Ill., Sept. 3-5, 1996 [hereinafter cited as Measuring the Costs]. 
5. M L. Frank, D. Lester, & Arne Wexler, Suicidal behavior among members of 
Gamblers Anonymous, 7 J. GAMBLING STUDIES 249 (1991). 
6. Henry R. Lesieur & Kenneth Puig, Insurance problems and pathological gambling, 
3 J. GAMBLING BEHA YIOR 123 (1987). 
7. U.S. Bur. Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't Labor (1997). 
8. SMR RESEARCH CORP., THE PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY CRISIS, 1997 123-24 (1997) 
(commissioned by the banking community, Am. Bankers Assoc.) (reporting a 1995 
Minnesota study). 
9. BETTER GOy'T Assoc., STAFF WHITE PAPER: CASINO GAMBLING IN CHICAGO (1992) 
(a comprehensive and classic analysis) (citing Politzer, et al.). See also Robert M. 
Politzer, James S. Morrow, & Sandra B. Leavey, Report on the Societal Cost of 
Pathological Gambling and the Cost-BenefitlEffectiveness of Treatment, presented at 
FIFTH NAT'L CONF. ON GAMBLING & RISK TAKING, at 8-10 (1981); Robert M. 
Politzer, James S. Morrow, & Sandra B. Leavey, Report on the Cost-Benefit! 
Effectiveness of Treatment at the Johns Hopkins Center for Patholo!Zical Gambling, 
1 J. GAMBLING BEHAY. 131 (1985). 
10. ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE ADMIN., MD. DEP'T HEALTH & ME1':TAL HYGIENE, TASK 
FORCE ON GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARYLAND 2, 59-61 (1990). 
Footnotes for Table 14 (continued) 
11. Study links suicide increase to gambling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1997, 
<http://webservl.startribune.comlcgi-binistOnLine/article?thisSIug=suicI6>. For the 
complete study, see David P. Phillips, Ward Welty, & Marison Smith, Elevated 
Suicide Levels Associated with Legalized Gambling, SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING 
BEHA VIOR, Dec. 1997, at _; see Press Release of the U. Calif. at San Diego, 
"Increase In Legalized Gambling Is Linked To Higher Suicide Rates in UCSD Study," 
Dec. 15, 1997; Shaun McKinnon, Study links gambling, suicide, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., 
Dec. 17, 1997. See generally, Sandra Blakeslee, Suicide Rate Is Higher In 3 
Gambling Cities: Study Shows Risks as Betting Rises in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
1997, at AI0. See also Stephen Braun, Lives Lost in a River of Debt, L.A. TIMES, 
June 22, 1997, at AI, AI4-AI5. This extensive article reports how coroner's 
subpoenas had to be issued to Illinois casinos to discover the $IOO,OOOs of dollars lost 
gambling by several suicides, and these problems were not reported as such in the 
local news until after this L.A. Times article was printed on page one. See Braun, 
infra. See generally, Art Nadler, Nevada suicide rate No. 1 in U.S., LAS VEGAS SUN, 
Aug. 29, 1997. 
Footnotes ,£o:c.f!~._U. 
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from: Div. on Addictions, Harvard Medical School, Estimating the Prevalence of 
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at 43, Table 13 & 51, Table 16 (Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall, & Joni 
Vander Bilt, Dec. 15, 1997) [hereinafter Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis]; see Press 
Release of Harvard Medical Sch., "Harvard Medical School Researchers Map 
Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in North America," Dec. 4, 1997 (From .84 percent, 
"the prevalence rate [for pathological gambling] for 1994-1997 grew to 1.29 percent of 
the adult population."). 
2. According to the authoritative Compulsive Gambling Center in Baltimore, Maryland, 
and other experts the percentages of pathological gamblers who are incarcerated for 
their crimes range between 12.5 percent and 15 percent. Pathological gamblers usually 
commit multiple property-acquisition crimes and are often incarcerated multiple times, 
but for the present analysis, only one-time incarcerations are indicated. See,~, 
ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE ADMIN., MD. DEP'T HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, TASK 
FORCE ON GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARYLAND 58-61 (Valerie C. Lorenz & 
Robert M. Politzer, Co-chairs 1990); FLA. OFF. Gov., CASINOS IN FLORIDA: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS 67-76 (1994). 
3. Bur. Justice Statistics (1997); OFF. NAT'L DRUG POL'y, THE NATIONAL DRUG 
CONTROL STRATEGY, 1998 17 (1998) [hereinafter DRUG STRATEGY]. In 1997 U.S. 
prisons held 1,725,842 prisoners which was an increase of 96,100 from 1996 and 
which reflected a 7.8 percent growth rate for the last several years. Id. 
4. The range of pathological gamblers who are incarcerated ranges between 12.5 percent 
and 15 percent which equates to 125,000 to 150,000 new pathological gamblers 
incarcerated from 1994 to 1997. By comparison, 5 percent of drug arrests result in 
long-term incarceration. DRUG STRATEGY, supra note 4, at 17. Therefore, a parallel 
argument can be made that 5 percent of pathological (and problem 7) gamblers will be 
incarcerated long term. This percentage would equate to 75,000 new pathological 
gamblers incarcerated from 1994 to 1997, but this number would be extremely 
conservative. 
5. These numbers reflect the number of prisoners who are pathological gamblers and 
these numbers are not the number of pathological gamblers who are prisoners. N.J. 
Coun. on Compulsive Gaming in Your State 2 (Jan. 25, 1997) (20% to 30% of the 
prison population constitute pathological gamblers). 
